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Abstract: This paper looks at the response of growers and merchants, first to 
vine disease and high prices, and then to the problems of overproduction and product 
adulteration.  France produced a large range of wines, but by the early twentieth century 
most commodity chains were failing to provide accurate information for consumers to 
discriminate between differences in quality. The paper argues that the different 
characteristics of individual wines, and the nature of their commodity chains, resulted in 
the demand for very different solutions to the low prices and profits of the 1900s. 
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 A series of large demonstration in France’s Midi in the summer of 1907 
culminated in over half a million people protesting in Montpellier against low prices 
and the sale of artificial wines. At the same time, many of Bordeaux’s leading quality 
wine producers were forced to look to their merchants for help, while growers of 
ordinary wines lobbied local and national governments to establish a new regional 
‘Bordeaux’ appellation.  A few years later, in 1911, troops were needed to stop the 
destruction of large quantities of wines that had been brought from outside the 
Champagne region to Reims and Epernay for making into ‘champagne’. This paper 
argues that the causes of these very different events was the natural instability found in 
wine markets, which had been aggravated by the major domestic shortages caused by 
the vine disease phylloxera.  
During the nineteenth century, falling transport costs produced a growing 
regional specialisation in viticulture, and urbanisation and rising real wages led to a 
significant increase in wine consumption. The major domestic wine shortages caused by 
phylloxera after 1875 forced merchants and even some growers to look for alternative 
supplies, supplies which they were reluctant to surrender when production recovered in 
the late nineteenth century. The result was a sharp fall in prices and profitability, which 
led to debates over various forms of market intervention. Proposals included the 
removal of surplus wine from the market by distilling, stricter controls on the 
manufacture of artificial wines, and the creation of regional appellations. None of these 
could be introduced without the support of the state.  However, the heterogeneity of 
French wines, and the very different commodity chains that had been created to sell 
wines as diverse as vintage claret and Bordeaux’s vin ordinaire, implied that growers 
and merchants were often divided on the most appropriate policies. Potential division of 
interests were found not just between growers and merchants, but also between large 
and small growers, producers of fine wines and ordinary ones, and between growers in 
different geographical localities. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first examines long run changes in 
France’s domestic wine supply, and in particular the impact of phylloxera. Sections 2, 3, 
and 4 look at the response of local growers and merchants, first to phylloxera, and then 
to the collapse in wine prices in three major regions. Section 2 considers the Midi, 
France’s leading producer of cheap, low quality wines, which accounted for two-fifths 
of national output at the turn of the century. The need to replant after phylloxera 
reinforced the links between small and large properties, and helped treat the collapse in 
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prices in the 1900s as a common problem for all the sector. With the state providing a 
legislative framework for controlling fraud and adulteration, local growers through the 
creation of the Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi established an efficient 
institution to regulate both producers and merchants and reduce the incentives to cheat. 
By contrast the much greater diversity of wines in the Gironde (Bordeaux) divided 
growers and merchants much more (section 3). Here the producers of ordinary wines 
increasingly found it difficult to compete against the low cost Midi producers, and 
demanded a regional appellation to reduce competition. This measure was opposed by 
both those local merchants who blended Bordeaux wines with those from elsewhere to 
create a more marketable product, and outside growers who saw their markets 
threatened. By contrast, a regional appellation for Bordeaux was considered as largely 
irrelevant for producers of quality wines, and the unique nature of their products and 
their precarious financial situation left many to sign private contracts with merchant 
houses guaranteeing them markets. Finally, section 4 looks at the Champagne region, 
where the problem for growers, especially in 1908 and 1910, was the lack of wine, 
rather than abundant harvests. Difficulties arose because grape prices failed to increase, 
in part because quality producers already had sufficient stocks maturing in their cellars, 
and in part because ordinary champagne producers bought cheap wines from outside the 
region. Conflicts were especially bitter because, and unlike Bordeaux, the ‘natural’ 
boundaries for a regional appellation to the Champagne region were much harder to 
determine.   
 
 
 
 
1. Phylloxera and the volatility in wine markets. 
Instability in wine markets was hardly new to the early twentieth century. 
Labrousse noted that in eighteenth century France, ‘the cyclical fluctuations (of wine 
prices) are .. superior to those of all other products’.2 Furthermore, not only did the size 
of harvests fluctuate significantly from one year to another, but so did the quality. In the 
short term, supply was relatively inelastic. Entry costs to viticulture were low, as the 
vine was usually cultivated on land marginal to other crops, required high labour inputs 
(and therefore considered an advantage when the population growth was reducing land: 
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labour ratios), but demanded little capital. According to Arthur Young’s calculations in 
the late 1780s, a vineyard yielded an annual average of £9 per acre, compared to £6 or 
 the best land in England, and ‘more than sugar pays in the West Indies, which is 
usually supposed the most profitable cultivation in the World.3 Vineyards were 
generally small, and on the eve of the phylloxera epidemic, there were an estimated 
1,628,808 growers in France.4 In the face of weak demand or growing competition, 
growers were reluctant to uproot their vines, but instead reduced labour inputs. Demand 
was however more flexible. High transport costs implied that most wine was drunk 
locally, and per capita consumption fluctuated with local harvests. Because of the poor 
keeping quality of most wines, stocks played only a very small role in smoothing out 
supply from one harvest to the next. Indeed, the limited storage facilities owned by most 
growers implied that any surplus in the autumn was thrown away to leave room for the 
new, and more valuable wine. In the cities, although merchants were reluctant to 
dispose of  old stock this way, the problems of storage and preserving wines 
discouraged the building of inventories.5 Only with the growth in distilling, especially 
from the seventeenth century, was there a commercial outlet for surplus wines. 
The nature of supply and demand was also shaped by local and state legislation. 
Wines were taxed in a variety of ways, which not only discouraged consumption, but 
distorted markets. For example, in the Ancien Regime, the church and nobility enjoyed 
privileges that allowed them to sell wines from their own harvests in cities exempt from 
taxation. They also encouraged legal measures to restrict the planting of new vines, so 
that they did not have to compete against the increase in output of cheap, poorer quality 
wines.6 The 1577 arrêt restricted the sale of wines in Paris to those produced outside a 
radius of 20 leagues (about 50 miles), which the crown hoped would produce more 
taxes and better wheat supplies for the metropolis, but indirectly encouraged the growth 
in production of wines from Orleans, the Loire and ‘the vineyards stretching south from 
7 Finally, the Ancien Regime’s legislation often restricted the movement 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
2 Labrousse, 1933, 1, pp.269-76, cited in Brennan, 1988, p.97.  
3 Young, 1794, 2, pp.21-2 and 25. Cereal land in England also required an expensive fallow. 
4 Guyot, 1876, tome 3. See also Degrully, 1910, pp.440-1. In late nineteenth century France there were an 
estimated 1.6 million growers when the active male population was only 13 millions; Loubère, 1978, 
p.167 and Prestwich, 1988, p.10. 
5 Brennan, 1988, p.96. 
6 Dion, 1977, pp.597-8. 
7 Brennan, 1988, p.94. 
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of wines, allowing local growers in Bordeaux, for example, to control the access of 
wines brought down the rivers to both the city and export markets.8   
Many of these legal restrictions to trade were removed in 1776 or during the 
Revolution, but the trade in wines remained limited by the high costs of transport, high 
taxation, and the low levels of urbanization. Improved market integration led to an 
expansion of trade, and the rail link between the Midi and France’s northern industrial 
cities, encouraged growers to plant high yielding vines on fertile land to produce cheap 
table wines and undercut traditional suppliers. Per capita consumption grew from an 
average of 76 litres in the early 1850s, to 140 litres by 1875, when the harvest reached 
84.5 million hectoliters, France’s largest ever.9 By the early 1870s there was a growing 
concern that supply was growing faster than demand, but this threat of overproduction 
was averted by the vine disease phylloxera, which postponed the problem to the turn of 
the twentieth century.10 
Phylloxera was the most important of a number of new vine disease brought to 
Europe from North America in the nineteenth century, one negative consequence of the 
decline in the Atlantic shipping times. The first was powdery mildew or oidium. This, 
during the worst years of 1853/56, caused French production to slump to just 17.6 
million hectolitres, and output between 1851 and 1861 only once reached 41.7 million 
hectolitres, the annual average achieved in 1832/41 (Figure 1).11 If the impact of 
powdery mildew on supply was severe, it was also short-lived, as it was found that 
dusting the vines with sulphur checked the spread of the fungal disease, and production 
quickly returned to normal, albeit involving higher production costs. Phylloxera, which 
first appeared in 1863, spread much more slowly than powdery mildew, but its long-
term economic consequences were greater. The aphid fed on the plant’s roots, killing it 
after several years. In time phylloxera destroyed virtually all of Europe’s vines. In 
France it has been estimated that between 1868 and 1900 some 2.5 million hectares of 
vines were uprooted at a cost of 15 billion francs, and chemicals, imports of vines, the 
costs of replanting and grafting accounted for another 20 billion.12 Wine output, which 
had averaged 57.4 million hectolitres in 1863/75, fell to 31.7 million in 1879/92, before 
                                                                 
8 Dion, 1977, cap.11 and Roudie, 1994. 
9 Nourrison, 1990, p.321. The quantity consumed by wine producers and their families (and therefore 
exempt from taxes) grew from 5 to 9 million hectolitres between 1850/4 and 1900/4, while the increase in 
off-farm consumption was from 18 to 42 million hectolitres. Calculated from Degrully, 1910, pp.320-1. 
10 Augé-Laribé, 1907, p.86. 
11 Calculated from Lachiver, 1988, p.582. No production figures exist for 1842 to 1849. 
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recovering to 52.5 million once more in 1899/1913.13 A number of solutions did slow 
the rate of infection, but all were expensive.  In 1873 the flooding of vineyards was 
shown to be successful, but required holdings to be compact, relatively large, and on 
level ground close to good supplies of cheap water. Two chemical solutions were also 
developed, namely the injection of the vines’ roots with liquid carbon bisulphide, and 
the spraying with sulphocarbonate. These were only temporary measures, and the only 
permanent cure was the grafting of European scions onto the American phylloxera 
resistant vine roots. This was technically not difficult, but the scientific work required to 
find the most suitable vines that were both resistant to phylloxera (and other diseases), 
and which adapted easily to the soils and cultural conditions found on each vineyard, 
was immense. A further concern was the quality of the wine from the new plants, 
although many growers also saw the potential for exploiting the new research to 
improve yields.  
The shortages caused by phylloxera required merchants to look for alternative 
supplies. One immediate solution was imports, and France switched from exporting the 
equivalent of 5 per cent of its domestic supply in 1866/75, to importing 19 per cent in 
1886/95 (Table 1). Another strategy to augment supply was through the manufacture of 
wine from raisins and currants that were imported duty free until 1899, and were 
cheaper to transport than wine.14  Even more controversial was the use of sugar in wine 
production. Chaptal had shown that the addition of sugar to wine must in years with 
poor summers, especially in northern Europe, improved quality, but did not increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
12 Galet, 1988, cited in Paul, 1996, p.16. Trebilcock (1981, p.157), suggests a ‘final bill’ in excess of £400 
million (10,000 million francs), equivalent to 37% of the average GDP for 1885/94. 
13 Calculated from Lachiver, 1988, pp.582-3. 
14  In 1889 raisins used for wine making were taxed 3 francs per 100 kilos, but those for direct 
consumption remained untaxed. It was estimated that 300 litres of wine with an alcohol strength of 8 per 
cent could be produced from a 100 kilos of raisins or currants, at the cost of just 0.15 francs a litre, 
considerably less than real wine, and there were reportedly twenty factories in Paris. Ordish, 1972, 
pp.148-50. 
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Table 1. 
 
French wine supplies, 1886-1895, in thousands of hectolitres. 
      
 1866-1875 1886-1895 1900-1909 
 000 hls. % of total 000 hls. % of total 000 hls. % of total 
Harvest  56,931   99.4 30,517 70.7 55,649 88.3 
Imports      348     0.6   9,510 22.0   5,620   8.9 
Sub total 57,279  40,027 92.7 61,269 97,2 
Sugar & raisin wines    ?    3,163    7.3   1,840   2.9 
Total 57,279 100.0 43,190         100.0 63,109 100.0 
 
Exports   3,229   5.1   2,032    4.8   2,141   3.2 
Drunk by producers 28,362 44.4   9,186 21.7 14,833 22.4 
Sold by merchants 25,687 40.2 28,794  67.8 44,295 67.0 
Vinegar & distilling  5,000?   7.8      681    1.6   2,200?   3.3 
Total 62,278 97.5 40,693  95.9 63,469 95.9 
 
Waste (6% of merchants’ 
wine) 
1,541 2.4 1,728   4.1 2,658 4.0 
Difference +6,540  -769  +3,018  
Net foreign trade as % of 
domestic wine stocks* 
+5.0%  -18.7%  -5.7%  
 
Per capita consumption c.144  c.110  c.162  
Average wine yields       
Average wine price 
(Paris) hl./fr. 
28.5  32.2  18.2  
* calculated as harvest + imports (i.e. sub total above) 
Source: 1886/95: Sempé, 1898, p.52 and Degrully 304, 428. Warner, 1960, p.35 . 
 
Table 2. 
Changes in wine prices in select French regions, 1840 and 1892. 
 1840 1892 Rate of increase 
Marne 15.60 286.76 18.40 
Gironde 18.44   62.87   3.40 
Hérault  6.67   17.55   2.63 
Charente M.  7.50   44.42   5.92 
Rhône 14.54   49.25   3.39 
Saône et Loire 16.73   54.20   3.23 
France 11.58   31.15   2.67 
Francs per hectolitre 
Source: Toutain, 1992, tome 1, p.254.15  
                                                                 
15 Nationally output halved between 1840 and 1892, fell to a sixth in the Marne (champagne), and a fifth 
in the Charentes, but doubled in the Midi.   
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output.16 However, sugar can also be added, together with water, to the remains of the 
grapes after their first pressing, and repressed to produce ‘second wines’ or piquettes. 
Colouring was then added, with fuchsine being especially popular.17 This practice was 
normally limited to produce wines for on-farm consumption, ‘in theory by law and in 
fact by the abundance of good cheap wine and the relatively high price of sugar’.18 The 
high wine prices, the desperate situation facing many growers, especially in the Midi 
because of phylloxera, and the relaxation of laws by the government, encouraged 
significant quantities of piquettes to be sold. By 1890 raisin and sugar wines accounted 
officially for a sixth of total French consumption, before higher tariffs and taxes reduced 
their legal production. Therefore if the wine shortage produced by powdery mildew in 
the 1850s had led to wine prices doubling in France, the price increase with phylloxera 
was much more modest, about a third between the early 1870s and the early 1880s.19  
Consumption, which had reached 147 litres per capita in 1875/9, fell to a low of  93 
litres in 1885/9 (Figure 2 and Table 2).20  
By the late nineteenth century, French wine production was clearly recovering. 
The 1893 harvest was the first in fourteen years to be above the long-term average of 
1871-1913, and the combination of rising domestic production, large scale imports, and 
the widespread manufacture of artificial wines, now threatened overproduction. The 
impact on supply can be seen in Table 1 although some of the figures are only 
approximate. In the first instance, the easiest recourse was to reduce imports. The tariff 
war of the late 1880s provided an excuse to increase duties on Italian wines, and from 
1892 those on Spanish wines were also increased, although the impact of this measure 
was initially limited by the use of free-ports and, until 1898, the depreciation of the 
peseta.21 Spanish exports to France in the 1890s were still 81 per cent of what they had 
been in the 1880s, but then fell sharply to 14 per cent in 1900s. However the decline 
from these markets was partly offset by the growth of Algerian imports, so that total 
French imports in the 1900s were still 5.6 million hectolitres, equivalent to 60 per cent 
of the figure in the 1880s.  
                                                                 
16 Output did increase of course, when chaptalisation encouraged production in regions which otherwise 
would have found it impossible. 
17 Ordish, 1972, p.144. 
18 Warner, 1960, p.13. 
19 Nye, 1992, p.12, makes this point.  
20 Nourrison, 1990, p.321. 
21 Sempé, 1898, p.205.  
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With the recovery in output after phylloxera, it was apparent that a number of 
important changes had taken place in the wine market. In the first instance average wine 
quality was probably declining. It is true that the technical advances associated with 
grape production and wine making were improving quality, but market demand was 
encouraging growers to specialise in producing large quantities of cheap wines, rather 
than small quantities of better quality ones. This was caused by the high transaction 
specific costs associated with classifying wines, which encouraged many merchants to 
compete on price, and measure quality simply by alcohol content. As the heavy costs 
associated with replanting vineyards occurred at a time when real wages were 
increasing, it was not surprisingly that growers in marginal areas gave up production, 
and by 1914 the area of vines had declined from its peak in 1874 by almost a million 
hectares, or forty per cent.22 The new vineyards were more productive, and yields 
increased from 22 hectolitres per hectare in the 1870s to 33 in the 1900s, allowing 
domestic output to recover from its pre-phylloxera levels (Table 1).  
As second fact was distilling. Prior to phylloxera, distilling was widespread in 
years of overproduction, or when quality was poor. The increase in wine prices caused 
by phylloxera saw a sharp decline in distilling, with production falling from an annual 
average of eight million hectolitres in 1865/9, to one million in 1895/9.23  At the same 
time technical developments in commercial distilling and the appearance of cheaper raw 
materials (grains, beets and potatoes) produced a significant fall in the price of 
‘industrial’ alcohol. When wines supplies recovered and overproduction threatened in 
the late 1890s, the market to distil surplus wines had practically disappeared. Some of 
the industrial alcohol produced was used in the manufacture of new types of beverages, 
often drunk in the assommoir or dram shops. However cheap alcohol was also used to 
produce artificial wines. The exact size of this trade is naturally impossible to establish, 
but was generally believed to have been extensive. For example, official wine 
consumption in Paris in 1903 was 185 litres per capita, half the 354 litres found in its 
suburbs. To avoid taxation, wines were often strengthened with alcohol to the legal 
maximum required before being bought into the city, and then watered down and 
adulterated with industrial alcohol.24 One report to the Chamber of Deputies in 1905, 
suggested that 20 million hectolitres of manufactured wine were circulating nationally, 
                                                                 
22 The area reached 1.66 million hectares in the mid 1930s, before declining once more slowly.  
23 Degrully, 1910, p.325. 
24 Degrully, 1910, p.356.   
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while another suggested a figure of between 10 and 12 millions. In the same a year the 
municipal laboratory in Paris randomly tested 617 wine samples, and found that 500 
had been doctored or adulterate.25  Imports were also affected, as adulterated wines in 
Spain accounted for perhaps a quarter of that market in the late 1880s, and industrial 
spirits were frequently used to strengthen wines for export to France.26  
Finally France, as noted, changed from being a net exporter to being a net 
importer when. With the recovery in domestic production, merchants found that many 
of its old markets were now protected by tariffs, restricting demand for French wines, 
despite their considerably lower prices.27 
By the turn of the century it was clear that reducing imports had not solved the 
problem of low prices and low profitability, which were producing serious unrest in a 
number of France’s wine producing regions. Among the potential solutions that were 
debated was the need to remove wine surpluses by distilling, a greater control over wine 
adulteration, and some sort of institutional innovation which would reduce grading 
costs, and thereby encourage growers to produce smaller quantities of better quality 
wines. All these measures required state intervention, either to provide capital in the 
case of distilling, or to reduce organisational costs with regional appellations.  
The causes of overproduction, and the most suitable policies to resolve the 
problems of low prices, were much debated by contemporaries. Not only were there 
often divisions of interest between small and large growers, and between growers and 
their merchants, but also sometimes between growers in different wine producing 
regions, and between quality and ordinary wine producers in the same region. Indeed, it 
is necessary to talk about wine markets rather than just one, as the market organisation 
for wines such as fine clarets, vintage champagnes, or cheap vin rouge, were very 
different.  To help understand better the demands for intervention, it is necessary 
therefore to consider the commodity chain, which linked producer with consumer, 
according to the nature of the different wines. Government legislation aimed at 
encouraging workers’ associations (1884) and consumer protection (1905) made it 
easier for individuals to co-operate formally, and provided incentives to look for 
regional or sectorial solutions to problems such as phylloxera or low prices. Table 3 
summaries some key variables in the three regions considered in this paper. Only in the 
                                                                 
25 All cited in Warner, 1960, p.37. 
26 Simpson, 1995, p.97. 
27 For French exports, see Pinilla and Ayuda, 2002, and Simpson, 2004. 
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Midi did the interests of both large and small growers encourage co-operation in their 
fight against phylloxera, a useful rehearsal for the regional response to low prices in the 
summer of 1907. By contrast, the producers of quality wines in both Bordeaux and 
Champagne found that they had little in common with the smaller growers in their 
respective regions, as their wines were marketed by using the brand of the château or 
maison, and looked for an individual, rather than a group response.  We shall now 
consider the responses of the three regions to low prices in the 1900s in greater detail. 
  
Table 3. 
 
a. Co-operation between large and small growers against phylloxera. 
 Level of co-operation 
Midi High 
Bordeaux Small 
Champagne Small 
 
 
b. Wine production and the nature of production difficulties in the early twentieth 
century. 
  Number 
of 
growers/ 
producer
s 
Homogeneity 
of wines 
Strength 
of 
brands 
Ease of 
entry 
for new 
growers 
Perceived 
level of 
fraud 
Need to 
restrict 
local 
output 
Midi  vin ordinaire 150,000 Relatively 
high 
Average Easy High Yes 
Bordeaux, vin du 
cru 
80 Very low Strong Hard Low Yes 
Bordeaux, vin 
ordinaire 
67,000 Low Weak Easy Low Yes 
Vintage 
champagne  
30 ?* Very low Strong Hard Low No 
Cheap champagne 300?* Average Weak Easy High No 
Champagne grape 
production (Marne) 
27,000 Very low Weak Easy High No 
 
* Refers to champagne houses 
 
Sources: see text. 
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3. Adjusting to dis-equilibrium: the Midi.28 
High transport costs and taxes severely restricted access to national markets for 
growers in the Midi in the early nineteenth century, leaving many to specialise in the 
less profitable production of spirits (3/6 liqueur) rather than wine. This changed, even 
before phylloxera, as the railways encouraged a rapid growth in the area of vines and a 
shift towards high yielding intensive viticulture.29 The Midi was the first major region 
to be devastated, and the area of vines fell from its peak of 450 thousand hectares in 
1872, to 268 thousand in 1886, before recovering to 462 thousand in 1900.30  State 
involvement was sought, both to help growers financially, and to find a scientific 
solution to the disease. Local institutions, such as the University in Montpellier and the 
Ecole nationale d’agriculture (La Gaillarde), played a major role in the introduction of 
American vines.31 The Midi’s large landowners were closely involved with these 
institutions and, through formal and informal labour contracts, provided a steady flow 
of information to the smaller growers. Inequality in regional land ownership probably 
increased in the second half of the nineteenth century, and by 1892 some 28.9 per cent 
of vines were found on holdings of more than 40 hectares, compared to 29.8 per cent on 
holdings of less than 5 hectares.32 However small properties were considered as being 
complementary to the larger ones, as these required skilled part-time labourers, 
especially for pruning.33 Phylloxera therefore encouraged growers to look for common 
solutions, with large owners lending equipment, money, the use of their wineries, and 
providing advice and often the vines themselves, in exchange for labour service.34  
Being the first to suffer from phylloxera had the advantage that replanting took 
place at a time of wine shortages and rising prices, which attracted large quantities of 
outside capital to be invested in the region.35 New large vineyards were established on 
                                                                 
28 The Midi includes the departements of Aude, Gard, Hérault and Pyrenees-Orientales. 
29 After 1858 the cost of transporting a muid of wine from Montpellier to Lyon fell from 50 to 7 francs. 
Degrully, 1910, p.324. The specialization in spirit production encouraged some growers to use high 
yielding vines even earlier. 
30 Pech, 1975, pp.496-7. 
31 Paul, 1996, p.23. 
32 Pech, 1975, p.68 and Augé-Laribé, 1907, p.136.  
33 This was not true only of the period under discussion. Augé-Laribé, 1907, p.136.  
34 Frader, 1991, p.69. Informal co-operation should not be exaggerated, as the decline in monitoring costs 
associated with the post-phylloxera viticulture encouraged the use of labour from outside the region. The 
presence of landless labour led to strikes, especially in years of high wine prices such as 1903. Frader, 
1991, pp.75, 92-3 and 121-5. 
35 The Credit Foncier lent an estimated 20 million francs to growers between 1882 and 1902, equivalent 
of approximately 10 per cent of the total cost of replanting in the department, assuming a cost of 1500 
francs per hectare. The bank favoured larger producers for economic and technical reasons. Postel-Vinay, 
1989, p.169. 
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the fertile plains rather than the hills, and growers used large quantities of pesticides, 
fungicides, artificial fertilisers, and even irrigation to improve yields. The vines were 
grown on wire trellises in straight lines, which facilitated the use of work animals, 
reduced labour requirements, and cut monitoring costs.36 As only a limited number of 
grape varieties were now found, harvests were not only larger, but had to be collected in 
a shorter time than previously, requiring new, larger wineries to crush the grapes and 
ferment the wine. The heavy capital spending led one writer to describe viticulture in 
the Midi’s as ‘une agriculture industrielle.’37  
The Midi specialised as a producer of low quality wines. When the black rot 
appeared in 1887, it ‘was so frightening that vignerons turned from vines grafted on 
Vitis vinifera to direct – producing hybrid vines, which scientists had singled out 
because of their resistance to diseases.’38  It was also argued that consumers demanded 
first and foremost wine, regardless of its quality, which encouraged growers to 
maximise yields.39  The hybrids produced large quantities of poor quality wine to be 
blended with imported Spanish and later, Algerian wines. But disease was not the only 
factor. Rising production costs, the low opportunity cost of traditional hillside 
vineyards, and the difficulties to obtain sufficiently high prices to offset the lower yields 
from their better vines also drove many traditional growers to plant hybrids instead.40  
 
Table 4. Wine production in the Midi and France, 1824/8 to 1900/9 
 Midi Rest of France Midi as % of France 
 Area Production Yield Area Production Yield Area Production Yield 
1824/28 209  5,331 26 1527 32,948 22 12 14 +16 
1862 394  9,713 25 1927 38,917 20 17 20 +18 
1870/79 410 15,064 37 1968 36,515 19 17 29 +70 
1880/89 295 8,946 30 1734 20,943 12 15 30 +106 
1890/99 401 14,861 37 1361 21,354 16 23 41 +80 
1900/09 452 22,225 49 1247 33,608 27 27 40 +50 
Area in 000s of hectares; production in 000s hectolitres; and yields in hls. per hect. 
                                                                 
36 Génieys, 1905, p.38, notes ‘1890 à 1900 ce fut le triomphe de l’Armon, planté dans l’anciennes prairies 
arrosables, conduit sur fil de fer selon les procédés des tailles de See 
also Gide, 1901, pp.218-9, and for monitoring costs, Carmona and Simpson, 1999. 
37 Augé-Laribé, 1907, p.19. 
38 Paul, 1996, p.14. 
39 Génieys, 1905, p.38. 
40 See Gide, 1907, pp.226-7. 
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Sources: Calculated from Lachiver, 1988, pp.582-609, 616-8. 
 
By the early twentieth century the Midi was responsible for two fifth’s of French 
output and half of taxed wines sold. The area under vines increased by 15 per cent and 
production by 130 per cent compared to before phylloxera (1862), and wine yields were 
now 50 per cent higher than the national average (Table 4). The Parliamentary 
commission established in 1907 to look into the causes of the national wine crisis, noted 
that the Midi and Algeria were the worst affected regions in France.41 Wine prices 
collapsed, and between 1900 and 1906, growers in the Midi had to sell at cost or below 
in five out of the seven harvests.42 Yet the causes of la mévente were not obvious. As 
many commentators suggested, the net supply of wines in France in the early 1900s was 
not so different from the level immediately prior to phylloxera (Table 1). But the 
financial difficulties faced by many of the Midi’s growers because of phylloxera, had 
led to the authorities tolerating, if not encouraging, the production of artificial wines. 
After the Brussels Sugar Agreement of 1902, which reduced taxes from 60 to 25 francs 
per 100 kilos, there followed what one writer has described as ‘an orgy of fraud’ in the 
Midi.43 For example in 1903 official wine production in thirty–five communities in 
Hérault totalled 1,004,915 hectolitres, but they sold 2,284,848 hectolitres, the difference 
being supposedly fraudulent wines. Nationally there was reported to be over 15 million 
hectolitres, equivalent to some 40 per cent of the official harvest.44 Yet this high level of 
fraud in 1903/4 was caused by two very specific features, namely the poor wine harvest 
of that year, which led to prices reaching their highest since 1887, and the very low tax 
on sugar. Wine output quickly recovered, pushing prices to very low levels once more, 
and the government restricted the use of sugar that growers could use and increased 
taxes once more. Unless growers could obtain sugar illegally, the profitability of 
sucrage was now greatly reduced.  
If fraud declined with the recovery in harvests (and drop in wine prices), three 
other problems remained. First, the knowledge that any recovery in prices was likely to 
result in a return of the problem. This was especially important when prices were low 
and failed to cover production costs. One calculation suggested that a local wine price 
of 10.7 francs the hectolitre was needed to cover variable costs, and 14.3 francs to cover 
                                                                 
41 Chambre des députés  (1909), p.2307. It was headed by Cazeaux-Cazalet a deputy from the Gironde. 
42 Warner, 1960, p.18.   
43 Warner, 1960, p.14 and 40. 
44 Degrully, 1910, pp.350 and 353. Atger (1907, p.73) suggests a figure nearer 8 million hectolitres. 
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fixed costs, but this second figure was reached only twice in the Midi during the 
1900s.45 As many of the large vineyards had borrowed heavily, interest payments had to 
be met and land prices collapsed.46 A second complaint was the poor quality of 
information available on wine stocks and the true size of the harvest. Finally, if low 
wine prices now discouraged growers from carrying out fraud, others in the commodity 
chain still found it profitable. Thus the 1907 Commission argued that low prices were 
caused not by overproduction, but by the poor wines that had previously been distilled. 
Since 1903 this was being treated by “la chimie vinicole” and sold very cheaply in 
urban areas, reducing the demand for sound, ordinary wines and forcing the prices of 
these wines down to that of the manufactured wines.47 
As the state had helped to deal with phylloxera, it was not surprising that 
growers looked to it once more for a solution to low prices and financial losses. Because 
growers in the Midi competed on price rather than quality, one solution was to increase 
consumption by lowering taxes and rail tariffs. The reduction in rail tariffs in 1896 had 
already allowed the Midi’s wines to compete more successfully with those of Spain and 
Algeria in Bordeaux or Paris, which were transported by boat.48 The Loi des Boissons in 
1900 lowered taxes on wines, and that of 1901 removed the octroi, halving the tax 
revenues from wine.49 Yet with per capita consumption at 168 litres in 1900/04 there 
were obvious limits to a demand side solution, and growers were forced to look instead 
at supply side solutions, and most growers in the Midi believed the cause of the problem 
was the widespread sale of adulterated wines.50  
The problem of controlling fraud was made difficult for three reasons. First, and 
as noted, high taxes encouraged adulteration, especially in urban areas and, until the law 
of August 6, 1905, the authorities normally only prosecuted those cases linked to tax 
evasion.51 Furthermore, what actually constituted adulteration was controversial, as the 
blending of wines, whether to adapt them to consumers’ taste, or to help preserve a 
barrel that was becoming unstable, was a necessary part of a wine merchant’s work. It 
was not unusual therefore for merchants and growers to have sharply divergent opinions 
                                                                 
45 Atger, 1907, pp.23-27. and, for prices, Pech, 1975, p.512. 
46Postel-Vinay (1989, pp.171-7) has shown the high level of debt of the large vineyards that made them as 
anxious as the workers, with their small plots of vines, for a solution. 
47 Chambre des députés  (1909), pp.2307-8. 
48 Sempé, 1898, pp.175-7. 
49 Warner, 1960, p.32. 
50 Not all however. Some believed it was because of overproduction, while others that the high tariff 
protectionist policies restricted export markets. Warner, 1960, chapter 3. 
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on what was acceptable, and what was not. A second problem was that there was an 
estimated 154,954 growers in the Midi,52 and many were themselves heavily involved 
in making artificial wines. Finally, and as noted, the lack of statistical information on 
production and stocks made it difficult to know the supply of genuine wines.  
Starting on March 24 with a meeting of 300 people in Sallèles-d’Aude, Sunday 
protests in 1907 quickly grew in size, and by May 5 80,000 took to the streets in 
Narbonne. A week later the numbers were 120,000 in Béziers, followed by 170,000 in 
Perpignan. By May 26, the figures had reached 220,000 in Carcassone, almost 300,000 
marched in Nimes seven days later and, finally, over half a million in Montepellier on 
June 9.53  Demonstrations of this scale were previously unknown in France, and can be 
explained both by the large numbers of people in the Midi who depended directly or 
indirectly on viticulture, and by the fact that the sector was united in its demands against 
the government in Paris.  
The government had in fact already begun to respond, and the laws of August 
1905 and June 1907 significantly reduced the amount of sugar that could be used in 
winemaking, made it easier to prosecute fraudulent wine producers, and introduced 
measures to record grower’s production.54 In September 1907, the growers formed the 
Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi (CGV), whose objective was to identify 
fraud and initiate legal proceedings against those involved.55 From 1912 it had the direct 
backing of the Ministry of Agriculture, and enjoyed a membership of 20,000 in 425 
winegrowing villages. The broad base of its support within the wine communities was 
crucial to its success, and the CGV’s 30 agents in 1911/2 carried out 3,042 
investigations that led to 601 successful prosecutions for fraud.56 
The believe that the collapse in profitability in the sector was caused by market 
failure went further than just the control of fraud. A number of influential 
commentators, including Charles Gide, Augé-Laribé and Adrien Berget, looked to co-
operatives as a solution to the problems of small growers, who were often forced to sell 
their wines at lower prices than the larger growers, and in some years had difficulties at 
selling at any price. The first co-operatives of the region were therefore initially 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
51 Warner, 1960, p.43. Taxes in real terms increased significantly during periods of low prices, such as the 
early 1900s, encouraging adulteration. See, for example, Degrully, 1910, 
52 Refers to 1900/09. Lachiver, 1988, pp.588-9. 
53 Frader, 1991, p.141 and Lachiver, 1988, p.468. 
54 Warner, 1960, p.41 and Frader, 1991, p.145. 
55 The provision for this was found in the law of August 1, 1905. Warner, 1960, p.46. 
56 Warner, 1960, pp.46-7. 
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established as marketing institutions, although the potential to exploit the growing 
economies of scale in wine production quickly became apparent. Gide in addition 
argued that co-operatives would be able to classify wines and guarantee quality for 
consumers better than private merchants, and thereby provide an incentive for growers 
to plant quality vines.57 However, as Hoffman and Libecap have argued in a different 
context, co-operatives were unlikely to succeed in raising prices unless the product was 
relatively homogenous, stocks were difficult to accumulate, and a significant number of 
individual growers agreed to output cuts, which could be easily monitored.58 Not only 
were wine co-operatives too small to influence market prices, but quality did not 
improve as Gide had hoped, as growers off-loaded on them their worst grapes, keeping 
their better ones to sell privately.59  
Two much more ambitious attempts at market intervention were proposed, by 
Bartissol in 1905, and Palazy in 1907. 60 Bartissol envisaged a commercial marketing 
board, selling 20 million hectolitres of wine a year in their own branded bottles, directly 
to consumers. In case of overproduction, all growers would absorb the costs of distilling 
to reduce supply. However, many growers were reluctant to sign long term contracts 
with an independent company and, if the size of the trust might have allowed it to 
influence prices sufficiently, the capital requirements (300 million francs) and logistics 
of such a huge operation, led to it remaining just a project. Palazy’s proposal was much 
more modest, involved the direct participation of growers, and wine was to be sold to 
wholesalers and retail merchants. With a capital of just 50 million francs, growers were 
required to enter into 5 year agreements, and the company hoped to control 12 million 
hectolitres of wine. This proposal also failed to materialise, in part because it was 
undercapitalised, but also because of the free-rider problem. There were costs of 
joining, but the possible benefits of any higher prices would be enjoyed by all growers, 
both inside and outside the association. 
 
3. The Gironde. 
 The level of co-operation in the Midi, especially among the growers, was not 
present in Bordeaux, as although the Gironde produced considerably less wine, there 
                                                                 
57 Gide, 1907, pp.230-5.  
58 Hoffman and Libecap, 1991. 
59 Simpson, 2000.   
60 This section based on Atger, 1907, pp.116-22. See also Degrully, 1910, pp.375-85. 
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was a much greater diversity in its quality.61 The success of the Bordeaux Classification 
of 1855 (which listed the region’s top 57 red wine producers in five categories, and 22 
white producers in a further three), and the rapid growth in British imports after the 
reductions of duty in the early 1860s, allowed a growing quantity of wine to be sold 
under the name of an individual vineyard.62 However most of the Gironde’s wines were 
ordinary ones. The producers of both fine and ordinary wines faced serious problems at 
the turn of the century, although for very different reasons. Consequently we need to 
look at both segments of the market, starting with quality wines.   
Phylloxera was officially noted in the Gironde in 1869, reaching the high quality 
wine region of the Médoc in 1875. Its subsequent spread was much slower than in the 
Midi, in part because growers and négociants were worried that the new American vines 
would ruin wine quality, and growers therefore spent heavily protecting their vines until 
they were convinced that this was not the case.63 According to Pijassou, wine from the 
leading Médoc growers was still being produced from the old French vines until about 
1900, and it was only after 1920 that it came predominantly from the new grafted 
ones.64 This had two important implications. First, the leading growers did not play an 
important role in the diffusion of information concerning replanting as they had done in 
the Midi, as they only started using American vines themselves when they had already 
been extensively tested on the ordinary vineyards. In addition, the heavy use of 
chemicals obliged growers to use five or six times more manure then previously, which 
produced higher yelds.65 
For the leading Bordeaux growers, income was determined primarily by harvest 
quality rather than its size. In the first two thirds of the nineteenth century, except for 
the years 1808/10 and 1835/9, there was at least one ‘good’ harvest every three years, 
and each decade, with the exception of 1820/9, enjoyed a minimum of ‘four’ good 
harvests.66 This pattern was interrupted by mildew, a disease that reduced the wine’s 
                                                                 
61 Guyot, 1876, p.429. 
62 Salavert, 1912, p.66, argues that until about 1860 even the best quality wines were sold under the 
shipper’s brand. 
63 Treatment was generally limited to the best vineyards. In 1894 the Gironde had only 7.6% of France’s 
land under vines, but 45% of the area being treated with sulfocarbonates, 27% of the area flooded and 
14% of the area treated with carbon disulfide. Calculated from Pouget, 1990, pp.98-7. This was also true 
within the Gironde itself. For example in 1898 the villages of Cussac, Cantenac, Margaux, St.Estèpe and 
St. Julien, which accounted for 2.5 per cent of the vines, had 4 per cent of the area flooded, 37 per cent of 
the vines treated with sulfocarbonates, and 12 per cent of those treated with carbon disulfide. Arch. 
Gironde 7 M 219.  
64 Pijassou, 1980, p.763. 
65 Quantities were later reduced, but remained significantly higher than prior to phylloxera. 
66 Petit-Lafitte, 1868, Table C. In 1820/9 there were three good harvests. 
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alcoholic strength and keeping quality and, devastated five consecutive harvests 
between 1882 and 1886. Between 1877 and 1893 there were no harvests considered as 
‘excellent’, and six of those between 1879 and 1886 were classified as ‘poor’, one as 
‘average’, and just one ‘good’.67  The considerable drop in income occurred just as costs 
were rising because of phylloxera, encouraging growers to increase output, a feature 
that was happening in any case because of the heavy use of fertilisers. As Table 5 
shows, quality wine producers in the Médoc not only suffered less than the rest of the 
Gironde in 1879/87, but output in 1888/97 had more than recovered the pre-phylloxera 
levels of 1864/78.68  
 
Table 5 
 
Wine output in the Médoc and the Gironde. 
 Gironde Grand crus, Médoc 
1864/78 100 100 
1879/87   43  67 
1888/97   78 121 
1898/07 123 138 
1907/21   72 
  
Sources: Lafforgue, 1954, p.301 and Pijassou, 1980, pp.776-7. 
 
Growers’ reputation for quality wines suffered during the mildew years of 1882 
to 1886, but the larger yields because of the heavy use of fertilisers made it much more 
difficult for growers to recapture markets. The very success of names such as Château 
Lafite or Château Margaux now contributed to this decline, as less reputable merchants 
in both Bordeaux and Britain exploited these brands by selling the large quantities of 
wines from the poor vintages that the desperate growers had in stock. Exports of bottled 
claret to Britain, by far the leading market, slumped from 58,030 hectolitres in 1880 to 
7,165 in 1913.69 The economic depression for the leading Médoc growers was both long 
and deep, with many owners being forced to sell their properties, and land prices fell in 
                                                                 
67 Feret, 12ed., 1969, p.137. The measure of wine quality is not an exact science, especially as an initial 
judgment of a wine’s quality can change by the time it is ready for export. See Lafforgue, 1954, p.299, 
provides slightly different results. 
68Château Latour, for example, increased output by 252 per cent, but prices fell by 58 per cent between 
1879/87 and 1898/07, and Château Margaux’s output supposedly increased from 450 hogsheads of 
 1,400 hogsheads in 1903 of “indifferent” or “bad” quality wine. Higounet (ed) 
1993, p.297 and Ridleys, April 1903, p.675. 
69 Simpson, 2004, p.96. 
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the 30 or 40 years prior to the First World War by up to 80 per cent in the Médoc.70  
Therefore, although the plight of Bordeaux’s leading growers in the early 1900s was 
almost as desperate as those in the Midi, the nature of the problem, and consequently its 
solution, was very different. In particular, the fact that the Midi’s growers and 
merchants competed on price and not quality, and that the wines were relatively 
homogenous, encouraged a group response, whereas those associated with the leading 
Bordeaux wines looked for individual initiatives. Because of low prices, most growers 
found it difficult to limit output and invest in their vineyards, in order to rebuild 
reputation. The problem was finally resolved by the merchants who, especially in 1906 
and 1907, established contracts with at least 60 growers, including half the Classed 
Growths, to sell all their production at fixed prices over the following for five or more 
harvests. Clauses were inserted into the contracts that limited production and the use of 
American vines.71 Backward integration also took place, with a number of the leading 
properties being bought by négociants, or by their families. There were also the first 
limited attempts to promote the region’s wines. In 1909 a proposed “Trust” between 
growers and merchants to raise money to promote Bordeaux’s wines was debated, but 
came to nothing. More successful was the Fête des vendanges, which helped promote 
not just the wines, but also the Bordeaux ‘marque’.72 
Bordeaux was also France’s major export port for cheap table wines on the eve 
of phylloxera.  In years of poor local harvests, the négociants had traditionally brought 
supplies from outside the region, allowing them to sell cheap wines in London or Paris 
at stable prices. The decline in the Gironde’s production because of phylloxera and 
mildew led to a rapid expansion in these activities, and the local British consul noted in 
1889 that ‘about 50 per cent of all wines shipped from here to British ports in wood’ 
were made using wines from outside the Bordeaux region.73  
As domestic harvests began to recover after phylloxera, pressure from growers 
resulted in import duties being increased in 1892, although a system of free ports briefly 
allowed merchants to continue to import foreign wines for the sole purpose of mixing 
                                                                 
70 Ministère de l’Agriculture, 1937, p.159. Third growth Château Malescot-Saint Exupéry, for example 
was sold in April 1901 for 155,000 francs against the 1,076,000 it had reached in 1869, or the second 
growth Château Monrose, which was sold for 800 thousand francs in 1896, against 1.5 million in 1889. 
Pijassou, 1980, pp.815-6. 
71 Cocks and Féret, 1908, pp.xvii-xxii and Higounet (ed),1974, p.335. The négociants insisted for Château 
Latour  that ‘the vineyard can in no way be increased during the period of the contract, and grafted 
American vines must be excluded, save those that are already there.’ Higounet (ed.), 1993, pp.276-7. 
72 Roudié, 1988, pp.217-9. 
73 PP 1889, no. 501, p.9.  
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with local ones for export.74 However, not only were these exports from Bordeaux little 
more than 200,000 hectolitres a year, but poor quality wines were often sold in 
countries which were also major markets for fine wines, and created bad publicity 
there.75 The closure of the free port in 1899, and Hamburg’s more competitive free port 
all contributed to Bordeaux’s decline as an international centre for cheap wines.76 As 
Figure 4 suggests, exports drift downwards from the late 1880s, just when  
domestic production was recovering. 
By the late nineteenth century Bordeaux’s growers were also becoming 
increasing uncompetitive in the domestic market for ordinary table wines. Lower rail 
freight rates negotiated in 1896 made wines from the Midi cheaper, not just in Paris, but 
also in Bordeaux.  In the 1900s, the Midi’s yields were over 70 per cent greater than 
those in the Gironde, but production costs were lower. The 1907 Parliamentary 
commission noted that the wine crisis in the Gironde was caused not so much by 
overproduction (‘fraude par multiplication’), but rather by low cost competitors (‘fraude 
77 In 1902 and 1903, the Midi sold the equivalent of 28 and 32 per 
cent of the Gironde’s local harvest, with other wines accounting for a further 36 and 
51.8 per cent. However when the average for the period 1902/06 is taken, the figures 
fall to 21.5 and 26.6 per cent respectively, and two thirds of the wines sold in the 
Gironde were produced locally (Table 6). Yet the Gironde’s growers were quite correct 
to identify the threat from the Midi as very real. Local harvests in 1902 and 1903 were 
just 82 and 60 per cent of the average between 1902/06, but French wines prices were 5 
and 47 per cent higher.  If the presence of the Midi’s wines in the Gironde was less in 
the other years, it was simply because prices were so low. Competition from the Midi 
effectively placed a price ceiling on what the Gironde’s vin ordinaire could be sold at 
and, with its higher production costs, this made production unprofitable in most years. 
For local producers of cheap wines the solution was to regulate the market by restricting 
the use of the ‘Bordeaux’ brand to their own wines, and excluding those of their 
competitors, regardless of their quality. 
                                                                 
74 Roudié, 1994, pp.212-3 and Gallinato-Contino, 2001. 
75 Audebert, 1918, p.15 in Arch.Gironde, 8 M 13. 
76 Faurou, 1907, pp.7-12. Phylloxera in Cataluña and Navarra also created difficulties in obtaining wines 
from Spain. By contrast, Hamburg merchants bought wines from the cheapest producers, whether in 
Portugal, Greece, Turkey or Hungary, and were more efficient at creating wines, and even enjoyed lower 
freight rates to Buenos Aires than Bordeaux.  
77 Revue Agricole, Viticole et Horticole Illustrée, 15 Juin 1907, no. 183.  
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The 1905 law provided the legal framework to establish regional appellations, as 
it made illegal the mislabelling the origin of products such as wine. Local growers 
naturally believed that their wines were better than those from the Midi and elsewhere, 
and realised that consumers required information and a guarantee of quality so that they 
would pay more for their wines. Although growers and merchants from outside the 
Gironde complained, the major opposition came from merchants within Bordeaux itself.  
They were opposed to the idea for three major reasons. First, because they thought it 
would be harder for them to maintain stable prices and quality after poor local harvests 
as they could no longer use wines from other regions for blending, and still sell them as 
‘Bordeaux’. Likewise it was argued that many of the wines from Entre-Deux-Mers, 
Palus and Réole required blending with the stronger Roussillon and Dordogne wines if 
they were to be transported.78 A second reason was the new appellation increased 
merchants’ operating costs, precisely at a time of low prices. Merchants, who brought 
wines from outside the Gironde, were obliged to keep two sets of books and the 
government took the opportunity to levy new taxes on the necessary labels which 
showed the origin of the wine (0,05 francs on a bottle). A final factor was their concerns 
over the implementation of the appellation. The law of June 1907 required growers to 
declare the size of their harvests to reduce fraud, and this figure was now the maximum 
that they could sell but, according to the Syndicat du Commerce en gros des vins et 
spiriteux de la Gironde, growers greatly exaggerated the size of their harvests in 1907 
and 1908.79 
For the producers of fine wines the establishment of a regional appellation was 
unlikely to resolve their own financial difficulties. They were primarily concerned with 
protecting their own brands, and their consumers were usually both rich and well 
informed. Nevertheless the leading growers and their négociants signed a joint 
agreement in July 1908 to find a solution to the sale of fraudulent wines. Although the 
négociants questioned the need for the introduction of controls of their stocks, they 
agreed to support the measures so long as they were not ‘inconvenienced’, and that they 
were accompanied by a strict monitoring of growers’ harvests. The Ligue des 
Viticulteurs, which represented Bordeaux’s small growers, strongly criticised this joint 
agreement, and claimed that the (1905 and 1907) legislation required merchants to 
                                                                 
78 Vitu, 1912, p.70. 
79 Arch.Gironde 7 M 190. 
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control their stocks, rather than apply voluntary controls.80 For these producers, the 
cause of low prices was seen as the influx of cheap wines, which they believed was the 
responsibility of merchants, rather than themselves. 
Opposition to the regional appellation was also strong from outside the region. 
Although historically a number of different wines had been sent down the Garonne and 
Dordogne rivers to be sold in Bordeaux, the commission in charge of establishing the 
appellation concluded that these were now ‘negligible’, so only wines produced in the 
Gironde were included.81 This was rejected by outside growers and their merchants, 
who claimed that the regional appellation had nothing to do with quality, but rather was 
an attempt to restrict competitive markets, and represented a return to the privileges of 
the Ancien Regime. According to one writer, ‘with this system France will no longer be 
a country of free trade, such as was achieved with the Revolution, but a cluster of 
provincial monopolies protected by excise officers. We shall return slowly to the 
Middle Ages’.82 
Finally, and as Mestrezat noted, a geographical appellation also had a number of 
potentially negative consequences for local growers.83 First, if merchants were not able 
to mix wines with those from elsewhere, they might be reluctant to buy from local 
growers after a poor harvests. Second, if the regional identity became associated only 
with expensive wines, this might lead to higher taxes for ‘Bordeaux’ wines in France, or 
in other countries.84 Finally, growers in the restricted appellation might now be tempted 
to increase production by planting on soils previously considered as unsuitable for the 
vine. We shall return to this last point later. 
                                                                 
80 Arch. Gironde 7 M 169. 
81 Cazeaux-Cazalet, 1909, pp.4-10, in Arch. Gironde 7 M 187. 
82 Cited in Vitu, 1912, pp.55-56.  
83 Feuille Vinicole, 12 May 1910. 
84 Champagne, for example, attracted higher import duties than ordinary wine in a number of countries at 
this time. 
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Table 6 
Wine supply in the Gironde, 1902 –1906. 
  1902-3 1904-6 1902/6 1902/6 
Local harvests 2478 4144 3478  67.6% 
Wines purchased from :      
Midi  746  750  747  14.5% 
Other areas of France  358  277  309   6.0% 
Foreign imports  700  557  614  11.9% 
Total 4282 5728 5148 100% 
Figures in thousands of hectolitres 
Source: Chambre des députés (1909), p.2352. 
 
5. Champagne 
Phylloxera was first discovered in Champagne in 1890, making it the last major 
wine-producing region to be infected. Despite this delay, the appearance of the disease 
created fierce conflicts in the local community. Like the leading growers in Bordeaux, 
the big champagne houses were concerned over the quality of wine produced from 
grafted vines, and therefore wanted to do all that was possible to preserve the traditional 
French rootstock. Unlike the Bordeaux growers however, they were usually not major 
producers of quality grapes themselves, but depended on hundreds of small growers. As 
a result, the leading houses were instrumental in establishing the Association syndicale 
autorisée por la défense des vignes contre le phylloxéra to fight phylloxera. With dues 
from the members, and subsidies from the government, the organisation tried to slow 
infection by destroying vineyards which showed signs of the disease with heavy doses 
of chemicals, and prohibited the introduction of American rootstock. But a policy 
limited to just the elimination of vines was unpopular with small growers because, and 
as one petition put it, ‘Phylloxera is at our doors and a large part of the vines are 
anaemic and sterile. We need to regenerate our vines … and to profit from the 
experience of others before we lose everything’. 85  In the face of widespread 
opposition, the association was quietly disbanded in 1895, and in 1898 the Association 
viticole champenoise (AVC) was established, whose activities included the 
                                                                 
85 Letter from growers to the mayor of Epernay, cited in Guy, 2003, p.110. 
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experimenting with American rootstock and replanting, and the purchase of chemicals 
and insecticides. Only 24 négociants participated, and their organisation, the Syndicat 
du commerce, played no role in it until 1909.86 
 These conflicts over the best policy to deal with the threat of phylloxera had 
been largely absent in both the Midi and the Gironde, but growers in the Marne were 
united in their demands for a regional appellation. Champagne had to be bottled at 
source and, although fraud was a major concern in the late nineteenth century, 
significant advances had been made by the leading champagne producers’ pressure 
group, the Syndicat du commerce des vins de Champagne, in controlling the illegal use 
of brand names and the appropriation of the word ‘champagne’ for other sparkling 
wines in France.87 However if after 1889 other producers could no longer legally use the 
terms ‘champagne’ or ‘vins de champagne’, it was not illegal for the champagne houses 
to buy wine from outside the region, to be bottled in Reims, for example, and then sold 
as the real product. The Syndicat du commerce attempted a voluntary code of conduct, 
requiring members to only sell as ‘champagne’ those wines produced from locally 
grown grapes, and which had been made in the region. When Mercier refused to stop 
the sales of wines to Germany and Luxembourg, where they underwent their second 
fermentation, the firm was expelled from the Syndicat.88 However, not only was this 
decision not made public, but there was also a significant number of houses outside the 
Syndicat supplying a growing market in cheap champagnes. 
Champagne sales increased almost five times from the late 1840s to the 1900s, 
partly as a result of an increase in the area of vines and better wine making skills, but 
also because of the use of outside wines.89 The best champagnes, sold under the 
manufacturer’s brand name and including the vintage, were not adulterated, although 
this market was perhaps in decline. André Simon, writing in 1905, noted that, ‘the 1889 
and 1892 vintages being excellent wines, and sold on the market at a highly favourable 
time, mark the apogee of the vintage Champagne boom from the point of view of the 
public’.90 However, an increasingly critical press which argued that poor quality grapes 
were being used in champagne production was responsible, at least in part, in the slump 
                                                                 
86 Quoted in Guy, 2003, p.115. 
87 The Syndicat was established in 1882 with the primary aim to promote champagne in foreign markets. 
88 Guy, 2003, p.79. 
89 The decline in the production of red wines freed some land and better control of the secondary 
fermentation reduced wastage. 
90 Simon, 1905, p.146. 
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in sales of the cheaper wines in the important British market.91 However, if foreign sales 
stagnated at between 20 and 23 million bottles, domestic champagne sales in the 1900s 
jumped from 7 to 15 million bottles.92 By contrast total wine output in the Marne at the 
same time increased by just 19 per cent, from 369 thousand hectolitres in the 1890s to 
439 thousand in the 1900s. As Alphonse Perrin, the secretary of the Fédération des 
syndicats viticoles de la Champagne, a lobby group of local growers founded in 1904, 
noted, ‘la misère du vigneron’ was not from overproduction, but rather from wine 
shipments from outside the region.93 
Champagne was a blended wine and, especially when the quality of the local harvest 
was poor or insufficient, the temptation for producers of ordinary wines to seek supplies 
from outside the region was strong. Indeed, as in Bordeaux, merchants argued that 
without the flexibility to choose the most suitable grapes regardless of where they had 
been produced, neither they nor the growers, would be able to sell their wines in bad 
years.94 The decline in prices from the mid 1890s (Figure 5), and the atrocious harvest 
of 1908 to 1910, led to significant discontent in the region, and the Fédération des 
syndicats viticoles de la Champagne lobbied for champagne to be only produced from 
local grapes, and made in the region. But unlike Bordeaux, there was a considerable 
dispute over what constituted the natural region of Champagne. The modern department 
of the Marne contains Epernay and Rheims, the two major centres of production, but the 
old province of Champagne was much more extensive, taking in also the modern 
departments of Aube, Haut-Marne and Ardennes. Growers in the Aube were 
particularly incensed at being excluded from the first boundary proposal, as they 
claimed they had replanted after phylloxera with low yielding varieties to guarantee 
quality, namely half pineau and half gamay.95 If they could no longer sell their wines for 
making champagne, they would be uncompetitive against the high yielding producers of 
sparkling white wines in the Loire and elsewhere. The Fédération des syndicats 
viticoles argued, however, that the Aube vineyards remained low cost producers of 
inferior wines (Table 7). Production costs were much higher in the Marne because the 
greater density of the vines made the use of ploughs impossible. Although no figures are 
given for the Aube in the Table 7, production costs were notably smaller because of the 
                                                                 
91  Simpson, 2004, pp.99. 
92 Guy, 2003, p.123. 
93 Le vigneron champenois, 14 mars 1906. 
94 Vitu, 1912, p.64. 
 27 
use of the plough.  As a compromise, the final decree of June 1911 created two zones, 
the Marne and L’Aisne, areas which had been initially included in the 1908 proposal, 
and another including Aube, Haut-Marne and Seine-et-Marne, whose growers could 
still sell their grapes to the champagne houses, although this information had to be given 
on the bottle.96  
 
Table 7 
Production costs of grapes in Marne and Aube  
  Yields per 
hectare 
Production 
costs per 
hectare 
Production 
costs per 
hectolitre* 
Farm gate 
price per 
hectolitre 
Marne Grands crus 20-25 3000-3500 144  
Marne Moyens & 
petits crus 
40-45 2000-2500  53  
Aube  80-100   20-25 
* Yields and production have been averaged  
Source: Cited in Vitu, 1912, p.62. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper looks at the response of growers and merchants, first to vine disease 
and high prices, and then to the problems of overproduction and product adulteration.  
Commodity chains had to deal not just with the volatility in supply, but also from 
changes in the quality of each vintage. Although France produced, and produces, a large 
range of wines, by the early twentieth century most commodity chains were failing to 
provide accurate information for consumers to discriminate between differences in 
quality. This weakness encouraged the widespread planting of high yielding, low 
quality grape varieties, especially in the Midi. However, it also encouraged the 
production of ‘artificial’ wines, which were sold even more cheaply. In the Midi, the 
collapse in prices in the early 1900s was attributed to widespread fraud and united large 
and small growers, together with large sections of the local community, to participate in 
massive demonstrations and the demand for state intervention. However, although this 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
95 Vitu, 1912, p.58. Pineau is a word as a synonym for the pinot family of grape varieties and better 
quality wines, while the gamay as a high yielding variety. 
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allowed the Midi’s wines to become competitive once more, their cheapness threatened 
growers elsewhere. In the Gironde, the producers of ordinary wines also demanded 
intervention, but this time to establish a regional appellation under which only local 
wines could be sold using the Bordeaux name. It did little however to help producers of 
quality clarets, who looked to their merchants for help, shifting bargaining power 
forwards along the commodity chain once more. Finally, in the Champagne region, the 
problem for growers was a shortage of grapes, and the fact that houses were importing 
wines into the region to make champagne. The better champagne producers and growers 
were in agreement on the need to prohibit this practice by establishing a regional 
appellation, but considerable controversy arose over the drawing up of its boundaries. 
The establishment of the geographical appellation can be interpreted in two very 
different ways, either as an attempt to improve quality by excluding inferior wines from 
outside the region, or by creating a regional monopoly. As merchants frequently 
commented, a regional appellation could at best only guarantee origin, but not quality. 
In particular, if the regional appellation was successful in raising local wines prices, this 
was likely to be only temporary, as growers would be encouraged to increase output by 
planting less suitable soils and /or use high yielding vines. After 1907 wine prices 
increased once more, and many growers experienced considerable prosperity keeping 
France’s soldiers supplied during the First World War. The boom was short lived, and 
by the 1930s attempts began to introduce the appellation contrôlées, which placed 
restrictions on grape varieties and cultivation practices used. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
96 Vitu, 1912, p. 36. For the conflicts, see especially Bonal, 1994, Faith, 1988, Forbes, 1967, and Guy, 
2003. 
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Figure 1
French wine market, 1831-1913
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Figure 2
French wine producion, consumption and prices
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Source: Annuaire Statistique, 1933, pp.62-3 and 179-80. 
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Figure 3
Movements in French wine prices, farm gate and Paris
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Figure 4
Gironde wine production and exports, 1875-1910, 
in thousands of hls.
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Figure 5
Grape prices in the Champagne region
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Source: Le vignerons champenois, 7th April and 23 August, 1911. 
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